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SUMMARY
Canadians are used to taking seriously the threat of separation when it 
comes to Quebec, but a more serious, less manageable form of conflict may 
eventually emerge in the federation between Western Canada and the rest 
of Canada. Where the Canadian government has been successful so far in 
managing the “conflict of taste” that has led to Quebec’s historic discomfort 
in the Canadian federation, because the federal government possesses 
the tools to address that challenge, it does not have the same tools to 
manage the “conflict of claim” that is creating increased dissatisfaction 
with Confederation in the West. The result is that Canada is a less stable 
federation than many observers realize. Interestingly, the future of its unity 
depends largely on whether the West is able to establish a lasting political 
alliance with Ontario even though that would mean Quebec no longer being 
critical for national coalitions. 
Conflicts of taste revolve around differences in political preferences between 
regions within a federation. While Quebec is animated by its different 
culture, history and language than the rest of Canada, which has created 
a conflict of taste, mechanisms have been put in place to help mitigate 
the friction, including: Provincial powers over key cultural institutions such 
as education and health, special fiscal and immigration arrangements for 
Quebec, guaranteed bilingualism in federal institutions and tax-collection 
powers unique to Quebec. Quebec’s ability to wield federal power through a 
Central Canadian alliance with Ontario has also helped partially alleviate the 
province’s discomfort within Confederation.
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1Conflicts of claim are more difficult because they involve disputes over “sharing the 
wealth” (as opposed to building wealth together). These arise when a smaller, richer 
region is called on to transfer wealth to larger, poorer regions within a federation, 
the way that Alberta and other resource-rich parts of the West have been made 
to subsidize the rest of Canada through equalization, tax and numerous other net 
contributions to the federal fisc. Because of the difference in populations, significant 
transfers are required in order to have a material per capita impact on the more 
populated poorer regions, while the larger, poorer regions can control through their 
political voting power the size of the transfers they wish to extract from the smaller, 
richer region. In these arrangements, conflict arises when the smaller, richer region 
feels as if the benefits from being part of a federation are outweighed by the cost of 
serving as a largely powerless cash cow.
This could feasibly become the case for Alberta, which is called on to provide other 
provinces with massive wealth transfers, even as other provinces have worked to 
hurt Alberta’s economy both through past policies (such as the National Energy 
Program) and recent ones (such as B.C. and Quebec’s opposition to allowing 
Alberta oil to be transported for export through their provinces). Canada, notably, 
lacks formal institutions that provide small regions like Alberta with proper federal 
representation, such as an elected and powerful Senate, as in the U.S. and Australia. 
Polls also show the attachment of Albertans to the Canadian nation state is not as 
strong as in other provinces.
Whether this all conspires to result in a conflict-of-claim crisis depends, largely, on 
Ontario. That province has in the past formed political alliances with Quebec against 
western interests, but it has also formed political alliances with the West, ensuring 
Alberta’s and other resource-rich western interests are protected in a way that the 
West lacks the political power to do on its own. Despite Canada’s deficiency in formal 
mechanisms to deal with conflicts of claim, there are ways the federal government 
could help address the West’s growing restlessness within Confederation, but it must 
have the will to do so. Whether it does depends largely on whether Ontario voters 
want it to.
2The analysis contained in this paper focuses on two different forms of regional conflict in a 
federation: conflict of taste and conflict of claim.1 These conflicts may support each other but 
not necessarily — they are independent in concept and have different implications for regional 
tensions. Conflict of taste arises from differences in political preferences among populations 
arising from institutions, historical context and culture. Conflict of claim arises from one region 
having greater wealth or income than others and being expected to share it with others. The latter 
is particularly problematical when the richer region is small and has little influence in determining 
national policy, as large per capita transfers from a small, rich region are needed to have any 
significant impact on large, more heavily populated poor regions. While, both conflicts lead to 
regional stress and a possible breakup of a federation, conflict of claim can be divisive since it 
focuses on sharing the pie rather than creating the pie. 
Much of the literature on conflict in federal states focuses on differences in tastes among regions.2 
Heterogeneous regions differ in cultural tastes for public and private goods but will co-operate 
to achieve economic and social benefits from a union. Many characterizations of federal unions 
assume that transfers are made between sub-national states (or, as we shall also call them, regions) 
to achieve a co-operative outcome by a central government. However, transfers themselves create 
conflict since transfers made between regions result in one region giving up wealth to another. Thus 
the political process used to determine transfers could result in conflict of claim. If, in a democracy, 
a large, poor region votes for large transfers from a rich, small-populated region, the small region 
perceives it has little control over decisions. Even the progressivity of the tax system is part of the 
overall transfers, since a rich minority can be out-voted by those who benefit from redistribution, a 
point to which I return later. The concepts will be applied to Canada where both types of conflict 
are present. 
This paper takes three parts. In the first section, I detail the underlying concepts related to regional 
stress: conflicts of taste and claim. The second section provides a brief historical review of 
evolving economic and political shifts in Canada, especially in the past 40 years. I conclude with a 
discussion of current developments in Canada with respect to conflicts of taste and claim.
CONFLICT OF TASTE AND CLAIM
What is a region?
We often make reference to regions, but what makes a region a region? 
Regions can be political entities as defined by legal borders, such as a country, province or state, 
governed by representatives, who may be elected by the population, as in a democracy, the system 
focused on here. Typically, regions are considered to be homogenous with a similar history, culture 
1 
The original ideas developed here go back to a paper I had written with the late Richard Simeon (Mintz and Simeon 1982). 
The idea of conflict of claim I derived in the analysis of federations provided in R. J. May (1969). The discussion in this 
paper is based on a book that I am currently writing on what I call Canada’s “western drift.”
2 
An exception is Spolaore and Wasziarg (2017) who discuss conflicts over public and rival goods. With public goods (where 
one person’s consumption does not diminish another’s, as in the case of law and order or governance), differences in 
preferences will lead to conflict since club members cannot agree on the institution. Conflict of taste described here pertains 
to voter differences not only with regard to the provision of public goods but other public-choice decisions. Rival goods are 
those in which consumption by a person diminishes what is available to others. With rival goods such as money, conflict 
arises as club members fight over the goods they both wish to have. Conflict of claim arises over rival goods of income, 
resources and land, as defined by Spolaore and Wasziarg.
3and common preferences among the members of the population. A region might have a common 
industrial structure. 
Regions can be identified in terms of certain common characteristics that can influence their 
voting preferences. In a federation this occurs both at the federal and sub-national level. Some 
regions may be dominated by a particular industry, such as finance (e.g., London), manufacturing 
(e.g., the Rust Belt in the U.S.) or by a common culture (e.g., Quebec). Obviously, a region 
may correspond to a particular legal entity: Quebec, for example, has been dominated by a 
Francophone population since its inception and is primarily a manufacturing/service economy. It 
is not uncommon however for a region to overlap several political jurisdictions. This is particularly 
important in the discussion below regarding Western Canada’s four provinces: British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 
Ultimately, sovereign governments directly rule the region, creating laws that apply to it, thereby 
creating a common institutional framework. Yet, even within a political entity there may be several 
regions, which are observed in terms of common characteristics such as their economic structure, 
history, culture and institutions. Political and administrative coherence among regions in a 
federation is the dominant characteristic underlying much of the analysis below.
An economic perspective in explaining the two conflicts
The underlying principles for the allocation of spending, tax and regulatory powers in a federation 
(see Oates 1999, for example) typically include the following: (i) national public goods (defence 
and trade) and economies of scale (large, risky projects like satellites) that favour central-
government provision; (ii) inter-regional spillovers (such as transportation and communication) 
and fiscal spillovers, favouring co-ordination or central-government provision; (iii) inter-regional 
redistribution, which favours central-government provision; (iv) subsidiary, favouring sub-national 
government provision of local public services and tax policies (being “closer to the people”); and 
(v) accountability, favouring strict allocation of powers to each level of government. 
These principles provide a normative view on “what should be done,” but they do not provide 
positive analysis on “how it is to be done.” To achieve unity, federations decide on the allocation of 
spending, taxing and regulatory powers to satisfy national and sub-national interests, often — but 
not necessarily — according to a written constitution. For example, powers involving significant 
economies of scale or spillovers might be allocated to central government, while those involving 
primarily autonomy and accountability might be allocated to sub-national governments. Even once 
powers are allocated to each level of sovereign government, mechanisms are needed to co-ordinate 
policies among the central and sub-national governments, such as regional representation in the 
central governing bodies including the cabinet, bilateral or multilateral agreements, and meetings. 
An important mechanism is representation in national legislatures that provides an expression of 
regional interests in central-government decision-making. Of 143 democratic federations, 39 per 
cent (56) have bicameral legislatures, with 34 of these having regional representation. Of the 28 
democratic federal states, 17 have regional representation in one of the bicameral legislatures.3
Conflicts arise, however, when regions cannot agree on “what should be done” because they do not 
have the access to “how it is to be done” mechanisms. This is especially important in the Canadian 
3 
The above data are provided by R. Hickey (2013). Canada is listed as a country with a bicameral legislature of which the 
Senate is selected on a regional basis. However, as discussed below, it is unelected (similar to the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom) and only has power to delay legislation passed by the House of Commons. The Senate is therefore a weak 
form of regional representation. 
4case, since central-government elected institutions have no formal regional representation (the 
Canadian Senate being unelected, legitimate regional representation is best achieved through 
informal mechanisms such as cabinet appointments). This is unlike the U.S. or Germany, which 
have formal, elected regional-based representative institutions at the federal level.
In Simeon and Mintz 1982, a simple model is presented explaining conflicts of taste and 
claim in detail. This will not be repeated here, but it is worthwhile laying out some of the key 
considerations heuristically.
Conflict of taste
With conflict of taste, we can think of two regions making quite different political choices between 
public and private goods (such as those represented by a similar production-possibility frontier). If 
they both operate autonomously, they can choose freely the optimal amount of public and private 
goods that they desire through public spending and tax powers determined by majority voting in each 
region. However, spillover gains might exist between the two regions, such as managing external 
threats or sharing a public factor, leading to increased consumption in both regions if they combine. 
If they form a union, the combined population makes a single optimal choice of public versus private 
goods. Both regions are better off if the increased consumption results in higher welfare. 
Why would conflict of taste result between two regions? First, the spillover gains may be 
insufficient to compensate for lack of autonomy. Second, regions differ substantially in their 
choices of public or private goods so that they put a very high premium on their autonomy (in other 
words, their preferences do not overlap). Third, power matters. The larger region, through majority 
voting in a union, can control the outcome; smaller regions will be willing to be part of a union if 
the economic gains are significant enough to them. 
The above assumes no transfers from one region to the other. Transfers could be made from the 
larger region to smaller ones to compensate for losses in autonomy. But who decides on the size of 
transfers? Transfers involve conflict of claim.
Conflict of claim4
Conflict of claim raises a different set of issues. In this case, regions may have similar preferences 
but one region is wealthier, perhaps because it has better access to natural resources or tidewater 
compared to another region. A union is more possible if the two regions combine for economic 
gains. However, to achieve an agreement, the rich region might pay compensation to the poor 
region out of altruism or for certain benefits (such as discouraging poorer populations moving to 
the rich region). The amount paid to the poor region is bounded by (i) the minimum needed to 
compensate the poor region to be at least somewhat better off than if it were autonomous; and (ii) 
the maximum that the rich region is willing to give up before it is in a worse position compared to 
if it were autonomous.
4 
The idea behind conflict of claim, as I call it, is derived from R. J. May (1969), who described how some federations were 
unstable due to the difficulty of achieving fiscal adjustments when a small, rich region supports large, poor regions. May 
discussed a number of case studies such as Malaysia and Singapore prior to their breakup and the rebellion by the Biafra 
region in Nigeria. May identified Canada as a stable federation since the richest “have” provinces — Ontario, British 
Columbia and Alberta — were more than half of Canada’s population, subsidizing the “have-not” provinces. Below, I will 
suggest that Canada is less stable than one thinks, due to conflict of claim.
5Now, suppose that the poor region is much bigger than the rich region. To compensate the poor 
region, a large per capita grant paid by the rich region is needed to have any impact on the much 
more heavily populated poor region in per capita terms. And who is to make this grant decision? If 
it is a central government, largely controlled by the dominant voting population in the poor region, 
a large per capita transfer supported by elections could make the rich region worse off (alienated) 
compared to autonomy. If the rich region is a donor by choice, it might want to see the poor 
region operate differently (e.g., moral hazard), an attitude that may be resented by the poor region 
receiving the funds. Obviously, a political solution is not simple. 
A broader framework when both conflicts occur
Conflicts in federation therefore revolve around differences in taste and claim that cannot be easily 
resolved at a national level. There are many potential areas of conflict, including around regulatory 
policy (e.g., environmental policy), internal trade, and labour policy. Conflicts can also pertain to 
budgetary policy, namely spending and taxing decisions. 
Labour mobility, for example, can reduce conflict since migration from poor to rich regions can 
lead to reduced differentials in regional incomes and conflict of claim. However, that could lead to 
the “emptying out” of a region that might have fewer people to share the fixed costs of public and 
private services, potentially leading to conflict of taste.
Trade policy is also important to conflicts in a federation. With differing preferences and industrial 
structures, free trade among regions creates significant gains to an economic union due to these 
differences. However, trade also introduces more competition, undermining economic power of 
both regional private and public interests. It is not unusual to find that these vested interests might 
advance limits on trade, thereby reducing gains arising from an economic union. 
Another important example arises from populations voting on the progressivity of the income 
tax. The large population might determine the “national choice” for redistribution even though 
the smaller region might disagree with the decision. This is an example of conflict of taste over 
redistributive policies. 
The choice of tax progressivity also influences inter-regional transfers. For example if the national 
government provides a public good of equal per capita value, such as law and order, the richer 
region will pay more for the public good through the progressive income tax compared to the 
poorer region. The poorer region votes for more redistribution that effectively leads to more 
transfers from the rich region to the poorer one. This is an example of conflict of claim.
Voters, however, may not just be interested in personal gains but also in social groups with which 
they identify (Shayo 2009 and Holm 2016). If voters are only concerned about their own personal 
interest, they will vote for those public goods and services and tax policies that maximize their 
individual standard of living. For example, using Shayo’s (2009) example, poor households vote 
for more progressive taxation and higher transfers compared to rich households if only personal 
economic interest is pursued. With elections, the poor population would dominate outcomes, 
thereby leading to a more redistributive government than desired by the minority rich. 
On the other hand, if voters identify with a social group more similar to themselves (such as a 
regional or ethnic group) rather than their own interest (or interests of their own social status), they 
may choose less redistribution if more redistribution compromises their own social group. They 
may also socially identify with the nation state, thereby voting for less redistribution if they believe 
the nation state is weakened (Shayo’s empirical results looking at OECD countries show that 
6stronger nation-state identification can lead to less redistribution compared to purely self-interested 
decision-making).
When preferences among populations for public goods and services differ, conflicts are reduced 
through institutions that provide greater autonomy to regions, especially in areas where tastes 
matter most (culture and education, for example). Conflict of claim, however, is more difficult to 
handle since it involves regional transfers being made from a rich to a poor region. These transfers 
imply a zero-sum game, unless the donor feels that there are positive gains from its wealth given to 
other regions that can lead to economic gains, such as promoting free trade or reducing pressures 
from fiscally induced migration to the rich region. 
If a central government determines fiscal transfers from rich regions supported by majorities 
in large poorer regions (Boulton and Roland 1997), this could result in the donor region feeling 
its wealth is being expropriated by a majority of another region; for the small, rich population, 
autonomy might be a better outcome. This point is broadened in Holm’s analysis, whereby conflict 
of claim will not necessarily arise among regions if there is strong social identification with the 
nation state. However, a combination of wealth and a smaller population base tends to result in 
regions having a weaker identification with the nation state, thereby resulting in a greater potential 
for conflict of claim. 
To illustrate, Catalonia and its conflict in Spain is an example of both conflict of taste and claim 
for the same region. Catalonia has different culture and history than other parts of Spain, including 
its distinct language, Catalan. Catalonia is also the most industrialized region in Spain with the 
highest per capita income. In 2006, the Spanish government granted Catalonia “nation” status 
and provided it the same taxation responsibility as the Spanish central government. Spain’s 
constitutional court struck down portions of this autonomy statute in 2010, ruling that Catalans 
constituted a “nationality” but not a “nation.”5 After the 2008 global financial crisis, many in 
Catalonia expressed anger with the per capita transfers made to poorer regions from the taxes 
Catalans paid to the central government.6 Support for separation became stronger as a result. 
Federations are often viewed as unstable when populations strongly differ in culture. Singapore, 
dominated by the Chinese population, eventually broke away from a Malaysian federation 
dominated by the Bumiputera. This is clearly an example of difference in “taste” that can create 
divisions in a federation, which I refer to as “conflict of taste.” However, it also reflects differences 
in economic power, as Singapore was richer than Malaysia. The federation would have resulted in a 
loss in wealth for Singapore through transfers to regions for which Singapore had little affinity.
A less well-known factor for unstable coalitions therefore arises from “conflict of claim” resulting 
from asymmetric economic and political power. This instability arises when a small, rich 
jurisdiction in a federation is looked upon as the source of transfers for the rest of the country. For 
transfers to a larger population to make much of a difference, a large per capita transfer has to be 
made from the rich to the poor. 
5 
See https://www.britannica.com/place/Catalonia. 
6 
Catalonia accounts for 20 per cent of the Spanish economy and 25 per cent of central-government revenues but received 
only 11 per cent of national spending. Some argue that the overall transfer to the rest of Spain is US$19 billion. See 
“Catalonia in Contention,” Harvard Political Review, http://harvardpolitics.com/world/catalonia-contention/. 
7A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
Canada has been undergoing a major transformation since its inception. At its founding in 1867 
as the Dominion of Canada, with four provinces — Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia — its initial focus was obviously on Central Canada and the Maritimes, and not the sparse 
population in the West. In 1869, the British government arranged for Canada to pay 300,000 
pounds for Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory from the Hudson’s Bay Company, 
which gave up its charter to the British Crown. The lands were transferred to Canada in 1870. 
Other provinces were established or joined later — Manitoba in 1870, British Columbia in 1871 
and Prince Edward Island in 1873 — which created a coast-to-coast country under the Dominion 
of Canada. From the North-West Territories land, Alberta and Saskatchewan became provinces in 
1905, while Manitoba was expanded and new territories were created in the North.
In 1871, Canada’s population was 3.5 million. Despite the vast area of land, the population was 
primarily concentrated in Ontario (1.6 million) and Quebec (1.2 million).7 Western Canada’s 
population, from British Columbia to Manitoba, was a mere 84,000. 
Of course, Western Canada exploded over the years (Figure 1). Today, over 30 per cent (11.4 
million) of Canada’s 36-million people reside in the four western provinces, which now collectively 
account for more people than Quebec (8.3 million).8 Ontario remains the largest province with 
13.9 million people, so that Central Canada — Ontario and Quebec — accounts for three-fifths of 
Canada’s population. However, if we look at the distribution of the population in another way, 25.3 
million or 70 per cent of Canadians live west of the Ottawa River that divides Ontario from Quebec 
and the Atlantic. This is a significant change from 1970 when Quebec was the second-largest region 
(27.9 per cent of the population compared to 26.5 per cent for Western Canada).
7 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/sectiona/4147436-eng.htm.
8 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=510005.
8FIGURE 1 PROVINCIAL SHARES OF CANADA’S POPULATION: 1971-2017 
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Canada is often viewed as having four regions: the Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and the West. 
Certainly the economic structure of the provinces differs. Western Canada is especially resource-
based (Table 1) while Ontario and Quebec have larger manufacturing, finance and public sectors as 
a share of GDP. The Atlantic tends to be more resource-based with fishing, forestry, mining and oil 
and gas, but the economy is small. 
The differences between Central and Western Canada are the basis of much of the discussion 
below regarding conflicts of taste and claim. The resource sector that dominates Western Canada 
is capital-intensive with highly variable commodity prices. The labour base, which is less 
concentrated than in Ontario and Quebec, requires highly skilled immigrants, typically younger 
and more educated. Risk and exposure to international markets is inherent in the western economy, 
thereby requiring continual adjustments to economic shifts. 
9FIGURE 2 GDP SHARE OF MAJOR SECTOR IN REGION (%)
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With the growth of the West, Canada has been moving from its traditional monocentric economy 
(based in Central Canada) to a polycentric economy, with one economy in the Ottawa-Toronto-
Montreal triangle and a smaller one emerging in the West. Unlike the Atlantic provinces, which 
account for barely more than a twentieth of Canada’s population and is struggling to even maintain 
its current population, the West continues to grow, even if its progress is challenged from time to 
time by short-term downturns in commodity markets. 
Each of the western provinces does not always act in political harmony since their political 
preferences are not necessarily in sync with each other. However, there is a region — interior 
B.C, Alberta, Saskatchewan and southern Manitoba — that is largely resource-based, especially 
concentrated in agriculture, forestry, oil, gas and mining. In federal elections, at least recently, 
the four parts of the region have tended to exhibit similar voting patterns. All four provinces also 
share a common history: they were underdeveloped parts of Canada at the time of Confederation 
in 1867, but grew quickly over time (as discussed further, below). Resource and land management 
was a significant conflict in federal-provincial relations, as the three Prairie provinces (Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba) were not given ownership of land and natural resources when they 
became provinces. This shall be discussed further below.
10
MAP 1 FEDERAL 2015 ELECTION, DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Legend: Conservative (dark blue), Liberal (red), New Democratic Party (orange) and Bloc Québécois (light blue).
11
MAP 2 FEDERAL 2011 ELECTION, DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Legend: Conservative (dark blue), Liberal (red), New Democratic Party (orange) and Bloc Québécois (light blue).
Economic shifts in the Canadian economy
With the growth of Western Canada, a destabilizing “conflict of claim” became salient in Canada 
arising from differences in economic power between the larger and smaller populated regions. 
After 1973, with the boom in oil prices, Canadian economic power shifted to the West. While 
populous Ontario was the perennial “have” province that subsidized other provinces, the situation 
changed after the 1970s as Ontario’s per capita GDP and personal disposable income moved to 
the national average and Alberta became much richer than other provinces (Figure 3). Ontario is 
no longer the rich province that subsidizes the rest of Canada, having officially become a “have-
not” province under Canada’s equalization formula in 2009 (this is changing in 2019 as Ontario is 
expected to no longer receive equalization payments once becoming a “have” province). 
Growth and labour productivity depends in part on capital investment. Over the past four decades, 
private investment has shifted to the West in part due to the strength of the resource sector, which 
is capital-intensive. Today, the four western provinces account for almost half of private investment, 
a much bigger share than their population share (Figure 4). 
12
FIGURE 3 REAL PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INCOME (2007 CHAINED DOLLARS) BY PROVINCE: VARIOUS YEARS
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FIGURE 4 PRIVATE INVESTMENT SHARES — WESTERN CANADA VS. REST OF CANADA 
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Implications for regional conflict
The case of Canada illustrates both conflicts of taste and claim, but for different regions. Quebec, 
originally New France, has had a different language, religion, history and culture from the rest 
of Canada, which was originally dominated by Ontario, a province formed by English-speaking 
British loyalists. Conflict of taste has been expressed in Quebec, which has sought autonomy in the 
delivery of public services (especially — but not necessarily restricted to — education and culture). 
Quebec elected a separatist party in 1976, voted against separating from Canada in 1980, and a 
second referendum on separation in 1995 nearly passed.
Conflict of claim is well illustrated by Alberta’s role in Confederation. Although Alberta’s history 
was influenced by American migration in the Far West (Woodward 2011), its climate and geography 
shaped it development, as the same factors similarly did in Saskatchewan, the B.C. interior and 
southern Manitoba. Resource ownership has given substantial wealth to Alberta, resulting in the 
fourth-largest province becoming the wealthiest part of Canada (as documented above). 
TABLE 1 CUMULATIVE NET CONTRIBUTION OF PROVINCES (2017 DOLLARS)
Province/Territory
Net Contribution
1961–2017
in $ Billions
Average Annual Net  
Contribution Per Capita
1961–2017
Average Annual Net  
Contribution Per Capita
2010–17
Newfoundland and Labrador -$172.3 -$5,501 -$3,177
Prince Edward Island -$49.1 -$6,607 -$8,458
Nova Scotia -$305.8 -$6,034 -$7,329
New Brunswick -$202.7 -$4,919 -$6,421
Quebec -$476.3 -$1,172 -$2,020 
Ontario $722.9 $1,225 $394
Manitoba -$175.2 -$2,712 -$3,573
Saskatchewan -$98.8 -$1,747 $305
Alberta $611.0 $3,674 $5,576
British Columbia $120.8 $551 $768
Source: Calculations by R. Mansell and M. Khanal.
Of all the provinces, Quebec has received the largest net financial transfers from the rest of Canada, 
with the federal government spending more in the province than it receives from Quebec in taxes, 
partly as an effort to mitigate separatist sentiments in the province. The case is different for Alberta 
which is a large per capita contributor to the rest of Canada. According to recent analysis (Hearn 
and Mansell 2018), Quebec roughly received $2,020 per capita in federal spending in the province 
net of taxes paid to the federal government from Quebec, while Alberta paid $5,576 per capita to 
the federal government in net taxes (all numbers in 2017 dollars).9 Cumulative net contributions for 
the period 1961–2017 have also been estimated (in 2017 dollars): Cumulatively, Albertans paid an 
annual average of $3,674 per capita or $611 billion in federal revenues net of federal expenditure 
to the rest of the federation (Table 1). This was far more than the average annual per capita net 
contributions of Ontario, B.C. or Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan became a net contributor in 2009). 
9 
Similar estimates are provided by Hartmann, Thurgood and Thies (2018).
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Canada’s diversity
Canada is viewed as a “mosaic” rather than a “melting pot,” with immigrants identifying with 
their cultural or social background rather than a national identity, unlike the case in the U.S.10 
Canada is relatively more diverse than other advanced countries. Using a conventional measure of 
diversity (or “fractionalization” as the authors put it),11 Alesina et al. (2003) estimate diversity for 
a large number of countries with one (1) representing complete diversity and zero (0) representing 
homogeneity. Canada’s measured ethnic diversity is measured at 0.7124, religious diversity at 
0.6958 and language diversity at 0.5772. In contrast, the U.S. diversity variables are 0.4901 (ethnic), 
0.8241 (religious) and 0.2514 (language). Generally, European countries have lower diversity values 
than in North America. The significant diversity in Canada helps explain the weakness of national 
identification, which contributes to greater potential conflict among regions. 
To analyze federal and provincial diversity, I use a measure similar to that used by Alesina et al. 
to measure whether Canadian provinces are more homogeneous than Canada as a whole, based on 
Statistics Canada 2016 census data (Table 2). Here, diversity is measured on the basis of language 
and “racial” lines. Ethnic diversity could not be measured as those answering the census can 
indicate multiple backgrounds, such as “Canadian” or as a region with an ethnic background 
(such as Scottish or Asian), resulting in answers that are well above 100 per cent of the population. 
However, one can see what portion of the population in a province or Canada as whole report 
identify as “Canadian.” 
As shown in the following table, the provinces tend to be more homogeneous than Canada in 
terms of language diversity. Canada as whole scores 64.2-per-cent above each of the individual 
provinces. The least diversified by language are the Atlantic provinces, except New Brunswick, 
followed by Saskatchewan and Quebec. In terms of “racial” diversity, Ontario, B.C. and Manitoba 
are more diversified than Canada as whole due to the size of Chinese, South Asian and Aboriginal 
minority populations in the three provinces. The Atlantic provinces, followed by Quebec and 
Nunavut, are also more homogeneous than Canada as a whole on a “racial” basis. The response of 
being “Canadian” is weakest in the West, the three territories and Ontario, and highest in Quebec 
(Canada as a whole reflects the average across all provinces and territories). However, only 32.3 per 
cent of the population list themselves as “Canadian.” 
10 
The term “mosaic” came from an American, Victoria Hayward, who published Romantic Canada in 1922. See  
http://activehistory.ca/2016/05/creating-the-canadian-mosaic/. 
11 
Fragmentation is measured as 1-H, with H being the Herfindahl index of squared ethnic, religious or language shares of  
the population.
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TABLE 2  MEASURES OF DIVERSITY FOR CANADA AND EACH PROVINCE AND TERRITORY, 2016  
(IN PERCENTAGES)
Language Diversity “Racial”Diversity Ethnic Origin as “Canadian”
Newfoundland and Labrador  6.1 20.4 53.9
Prince Edward Island 17.5 12.9 42.3
Nova Scotia 17.1 22.4 42.6
New Brunswick 48.9 14.0 55.8
Quebec 39.9 27.8 58.3
Ontario 54.9 52.7 23.5
Manitoba 44.7 54.5 19.4
Saskatchewan 32.0 44.1 20.6
Alberta 44.6 49.7 22.7
British Columbia 51.8 56.9 19.0
Yukon 32.7 48.0 24.6
Northwest Territories 40.4 58.4 18.6
Nunavut 43.1 24.9  3.7
Canada 64.2 45.9 32.3
Note: Values closer to one (1) imply greater diversity in columns one and two, measured as one minus the squared 
proportion of population in each category. Language diversity is based on “English,” “French,” “Mandarin,” “Tagalog,” 
“German,” “Arabic,” “Cantonese,” “Spanish” and “Inuktitut,” among others. “Racial” diversity is broken down according 
to “Aboriginal,” “non-minority (white),” “Chinese,” “Filipino,” “South Asian,” “Black,” and “Arab,” among others.
Source: Statistics Canada 2016 census.
The federal government has been long dominated by Central Canadians or the “Laurentian 
Consensus,”12 with political, business and thought leaders residing in the two major provinces, 
Ontario and Quebec. However, given today’s distribution of population, diversity and economic 
power, political coalitions can now form either between Central Canadians (Ontario and Quebec) 
or between Ontario and Western Canada, the latter happening from 2006–15.13 While the 2015 
election returned the Liberals to power with strong representation across Central Canada, Bricker 
and Ibbitson’s (2013) key message still holds: A political coalition between Ontario and the West 
can dominate Canadian politics without Quebec playing a central role, just as a Central Canadian 
coalition does not require support from Western Canada. Electoral power at the federal level 
therefore depends on the distribution of seats in Canada’s first-past-the-post system, and provincial 
shares largely depend on population shares. The question is which type of political coalition will 
dominate in the 21st Century, with Ontario as the axis, and whether Canada will have unstable 
coalitions over time related to shifts in economic and political power. 
A political coalition without the West can result in regional stress if the West feels that its wealth is 
being expropriated. A coalition without Quebec can result in central-government decisions being 
made without taking into account Quebec’s distinct tastes. 
12 
John Ibbitson (2012).
13 
Hansard; 39th Parliament, 1st Session; No. 087, November 27, 2006.
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Accommodation with conflict of taste: Quebec
If there are not differences in tastes among regions, obviously no accommodation is needed 
for regional preferences. A more likely differentiation in voting would arise with voters having 
different economic backgrounds that can be dealt with through a central government’s political 
process. The approach to accommodation for conflict of taste is decentralization in a federation 
where provinces have control over certain powers, especially those most attached to cultural and 
economic affairs. The federal role would be to support national identity and mitigate spillovers at 
the central level. 
In the case of Canada, conflict of taste has been endemic ever since both France and Britain 
competed for control of North America in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Francophone population 
dominated Quebec while an Anglophone population, including British Loyalists who left the U.S. 
after the American Revolution, dominated Upper Canada (Ontario). For much of its history, Canada 
has been vexed with the issue of accommodating Quebec, which clearly expresses a different 
culture, language and, putting it in political terms, different voting preferences than the rest of 
Canada. When such differences in taste arise, it can be difficult to maintain a federation since a 
coalition of interests may not be possible, with each jurisdiction looking for its own independence. 
Even though Quebec had two referendums to separate in 1980 and 1995 and rejected the concept 
(by a slim majority the second time), Canada has been able to maintain its federation by adjusting 
its policies to enable Quebec to pursue its objectives as a nation within a nation. 
A partial list of these adjustments has included the following. 
First, certain constitutional guarantees were provided that enabled provinces to have power 
over policies related to their institutions. At the time of Confederation, the provinces were given 
control of institutions including education, hospitals and property rights under the British North 
America Act of 1867. Primary education was particularly important since it related to maintaining 
the Catholic religion in Quebec and Protestantism in Ontario (Section 93), while nevertheless 
guaranteeing religious education for the minority of either religion in each province. French 
and English were also guaranteed in proceedings of both Parliament and the Quebec legislature 
(Section 133). When the Supreme Court of Canada was later created, two of its judges were 
to be from Quebec (which uses civil law) and proceedings were permitted in either language. 
Bilingualism has also been extended over the years at the federal level, including requiring the civil 
service to speak both French and English. 
Second, Quebec was given more autonomy with respect to taxation powers. The federal 
government rented tax fields in 1942 from all provinces during the Second World War (only 
federal tax rates therefore applied, and cash grants were given to the provinces). After the Second 
World War, rental agreements with the provinces continued until 1962, except for Quebec, which 
preferred tax abatements instead. Quebec introduced its own corporate income tax in 1947 and 
its own personal income tax in 1954. Today, Alberta and Quebec are the only two provinces that 
collect their own corporate income tax and Quebec is the only province to collect its own personal 
income tax. Quebec also negotiated a unique arrangement with the federal government to collect 
value-added taxes: Quebec collects both the federal Goods and Services Tax and provincial Quebec 
Sales Tax, while other provinces allow the federal government to collect the Harmonized Sales Tax 
for both governments via a tax-collection agreement. 
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Third, Quebec was also historically given opting-out provisions with respect to federal spending 
powers (other provinces were given the same option but were not interested in the arrangement). In 
compensation for its non-participation, Quebec received tax-point transfers instead of cash-based 
grants. By 1966, as a result of these various opting-out provisions, Quebec was receiving twenty-
three additional personal tax points and one corporate tax point over and above the tax abatements 
of the other provinces. 
Other arrangements are often provided to give Quebec more autonomy, such as in the case of 
labour-market training.
Another benefit enjoyed by Quebec is its ability to share federal power, along with Ontario, by 
being part of a winning coalition, including in John A. MacDonald’s first government at the time of 
Confederation. 
The use of asymmetric federalism has enabled Canada to deal with Quebec’s special place 
in Confederation. It has not been an easy issue to manage, especially since Western Canada 
was dominated by non-British and non-French immigration over the years and, hence, did not 
understand why it did not receive its own special consideration. This resentment particularly grew 
more important with western grievances over federal policies, as discussed below. 
Accommodation with conflict of claim: Alberta
Conflict of claim is more difficult to handle since it often involves a zero-sum game over the 
distribution of resources. With strong regional rather than national identification (Holm 2016), 
voters in a small province feel more aggrieved over the transfer of resources to the rest of Canada. 
Unlike conflict of taste, which can be dealt with through various federal mechanisms that can 
provide autonomy to a province over policies reflecting taste (e.g., education and redistributive 
policies), conflict of claim means “sharing the wealth,” which, in order to avoid conflict, requires 
the donor province to perceive that there are gains to such sharing, as discussed above.
Mechanisms to deal with conflict of claim are twofold. The first is the assignment of spending 
and taxing powers to provinces to enable them greater autonomy over policies that manage and 
redistribute income and wealth. Second, given control over resources, the subnational entity will 
wish to preserve its power over its resource wealth. Third, regional representation at the federal 
level or co-ordination mechanisms that facilitate bargaining can assist in reducing conflict of claim. 
The most difficult problem is when majority voting at the federal level results in policies contrary 
to the interests of the subnational entity that is “paying the bills,” as in the case of Alberta.
When Canada was created, the MacDonald government pursued a National Policy that 
encompassed three elements: Tariffs would be used to protect the manufacturing industry in 
Central Canada; immigration would be pursued to grow populations in the West; and a railway 
would be built to connect all parts of Canada. While the National Policy successfully aimed to 
build Canada into a nation and forestall U.S. growth in the western part of the continent, it also 
sowed the seeds of western discontent for later years. The conflict over provincial natural-resources 
ownership is especially prominent and remains so today.
The western provinces resented the domination of Ontario over banking as well as federal tariffs 
that made consumer goods and farm equipment more expensive. Farmers were particularly upset 
with loans called in during the Great Depression, leading to demands among many Albertans for 
separation from Canada. This led to the election of the Social Credit party in Alberta, which passed 
legislation to tax and regulate all banks in Alberta. The courts declared the legislation as ultra 
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vires,14 since only the federal government had banking powers. Nonetheless, the western provinces 
did create co-operatives and non-bank financial institutions over the years to fund business 
development and mortgages in their provinces. Tariffs have been reduced due to international free-
trade agreements and many of these century-old grievances have thus disappeared. However, the 
development of natural resources continues as the most important conflict of claim. 
When Canada was created, the four initial provinces in Confederation — Ontario, Quebec, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia — owned lands and resources. When British Columbia joined in 
1871 and Prince Edward Island joined in 1873, they were given similar rights to land and natural-
resource ownership. However, no similar rights were given to Manitoba, which became a province 
in 1870, nor to Alberta and Saskatchewan when they were made provinces in 1905. At the heart 
of the problem was that Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta were created from Rupert’s Land, 
which the federal government purchased from the Hudson’s Bay Company. The federal government 
wanted to retain ownership of western assets to facilitate colonization efforts and railway 
construction, and the other provinces wanted more federal grants if the three provinces were given 
resource ownership (Janigan 2013). Provincial grievances continued until 1930 when the federal 
government transferred resource ownership to the three Prairie provinces.
While mineral revenues were not significant, land ownership was important to the provinces as 
a source of revenue. At the beginning of Confederation, much of the federal revenues initially 
came from custom duties and excise taxes, with a minor amount from non-tax revenues. Custom 
duties accounted for 60 per cent of total revenues, a major source of revenues for the Dominion. 
Excise duties, also a Dominion tax, accounted for about a fifth of total revenues. Provincial 
revenues were generally from non-tax revenues (land sales, licences and public domain, including 
natural-resource revenues), although the federal government raised some non-tax revenues, such 
as land sales in the territories. Thus, the lack of resource ownership for the three provinces was a 
significant issue, as the provinces needed funds for schools, hospitals and infrastructure as their 
populations grew.
The conflict of claim over resource ownership reached a new level in 1980 with the federal 
government’s National Energy Program, a catalyst that inflamed western separation. With the 
NEP, the federal Liberal government adopted a public policy that subsidized domestic energy 
prices below world market prices, paid for by new taxes levied on oil and gas exported to the U.S., 
representing a potential loss of $133 billion in the present value of energy rents accruing to the 
oil-and-gas-producing provinces in the West.15 With the NEP coinciding with a downturn in oil 
prices, Alberta’s economy was badly hit. Western frustration resulted in the creation of the Western 
Canada Concept Party in Alberta, whose platform favoured separation (it elected one member to 
the Alberta legislature). With the defeat of the federal Liberal government in 1984 and the election 
of the more western-friendly Mulroney Progressive Conservative government, which ended the 
National Energy Program, calls for separation quieted down. 
No western provinces had a referendum to separate after the National Energy Program in 1980, 
but voters did express their disaffection with Central Canada by spawning the new federal Reform 
Party, which eventually merged with the Progressive Conservatives to become a new Conservative 
14 
Supreme Court of Canada Reference Re: Alberta Statutes — The Bank Taxation Act; The Credit of Alberta Regulation Act; 
and the Accurate News and Information Act [1938] SCR 100 
Date: 1938-03-04.
15 
Helliwell and McCrae (1981). Albertans lost $46,000 per capita and non-Albertan Canadians gained $7,500 per capita. 
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party. This new party led to a political coalition of Ontario and western interests, resulting in the 
election of the Harper Conservative government in 2006. 
Conflict of claim for oil-and-gas-producing provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan primarily, 
has reasserted itself in the past several years. With the development of oil sands projects and 
controversy over their environmental impact, opponents have made attempts to stop their 
development.16 While several new pipelines were in service by 2010 (such as Enbridge’s Clipper 
line and TransCanada’s Keystone pipeline), the former Obama administration in the U.S. would 
not sanction TransCanada’s proposed Keystone XL (the Trump administration has now approved 
it but, at this time, it is still subject to Nebraska regulatory approval and must clear a Montana 
court injunction). 
A proposal by TransCanada to build the Energy East line, converting for oil transport a natural 
gas mainline from Alberta to Montreal, extending to New Brunswick, was withdrawn in face of 
federal regulatory changes during the application stage and Quebec’s opposition. An Enbridge 
pipeline, Northern Gateway, shall no longer be built, despite having won regulatory approval, 
since the federal government banned tankers carrying oil sands products from B.C’s north coast. 
A proposal by Kinder Morgan to expand the Trans Mountain pipeline to transport more oil to 
Vancouver’s port for export has been approved by the federal government but, with regulatory and 
legal uncertainties, Kinder Morgan considered withdrawing the application leading the federal 
government to purchase the pipeline. However, the pipeline’s future still remains unclear. B.C. and 
some First Nations oppose the project. A recent federal court decision has stalled the pipeline’s 
construction, requiring greater consultation with First Nations located near tidewater and study 
of marine-life impacts. As a result of new pipeline transportation projects being blocked, the 
transportation system for Alberta oil is highly constrained, resulting in a current loss in revenues 
and royalties of $14.7 billion per year, based on one recent estimate. 
The federal government's Bill C-69, which includes The Impact Assessment Act, is currently being 
considered by the Senate and has not yet been passed. However, it is deeply opposed by Alberta 
and Saskatchewan, with Ontario recently objecting as well. The bill would significantly alter the 
approval process for resource projects under federal purview and the construction of interprovincial 
infrastructure. The act includes twenty social, environmental and economic factors such as 
sustainability, other options to the project, gender implications, health effects and climate change, 
which are to be addressed by a proponent in the application. The minister can choose to block a 
proposal before an assessment is made. Although the legislation provides for a faster approval time 
including 300 days for the final decision, the minister has opportunities to “stop the clock” during 
the process. Governments in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario fear that many resource projects 
will be put on hold due to regulatory and delay costs. 
Similar opposition has developed towards liquefied natural gas plant developments in British 
Columbia. Canada, unlike the U.S. and Australia, has not yet built an LNG plant for exporting 
natural gas to Asia, even though the former B.C. Liberal government tried to develop projects 
before it lost power in 2017 (to retain power, the current NDP minority government requires 
support from the Green Party, which is opposed to LNG developments). A recent LNG project has 
gained approval by the B.C. government, although it may still be challenged in the courts. This has 
also become a grievance for oil-and-gas-producing provinces in other parts of the West. 
16 
It could be argued that conflict of taste is involved, since Albertans have different preferences as an oil producer rather than 
a consumer. In a 2015 Abacus poll on priorities, economic issues ranked highest in all provinces (roughly a third), although 
it was highest in Alberta (47 per cent). Environment ranked fourth of seven issues, and was ranked lowest in Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba (roughly five per cent) and highest in British Columbia (10 per cent). These differences in 
“tastes” are not significant. See http://abacusdata.ca/what-keeps-us-awake-top-national-issues/. 
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These recent developments are a classic issue of conflict of claim, in part between B.C. and Alberta 
and Saskatchewan, but also with the federal government and Quebec.17 The federal government is 
pursuing carbon-reduction policies to meet a target of lowering greenhouse gas emissions by 30 per 
cent by 2030, which at current trends is unlikely to happen. Opposition to pipeline construction and 
LNG plants that would raise Canada’s GHG emissions in the coming years is based on concerns that 
it will make it harder for other parts of Canada to achieve climate change goals. On the other hand, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and, to a lesser extent, Manitoba feel particularly aggrieved, since oil and 
gas development is being constrained and wealth is being lost even though production continues 
elsewhere in the world, especially in the U.S. with its growth in shale oil and gas production. 
Given the size of Alberta’s net contribution to the rest of Canada, Albertans are raising concerns 
about the equalization program that has benefited other provinces, especially Quebec, which helped 
block the Energy East pipeline proposal. 
The resolution of these issues is not easily achieved as in the case of Quebec’s conflict of taste, 
thereby making it a more dangerous form of regional conflict. Perhaps these issues could be 
dealt with institutional reform, such as creating a truly regionally-based elected second chamber 
at the federal level, but this is a topic that would need much more exploration and discussion. 
Alternatively, Canada’s decentralized federal structure enables regional differentiation to take place 
at the provincial level, even if not all conflicts are settled. Some particular reforms would include 
the following:
• Like Quebec, Alberta could push for federal transfers to be converted from cash to personal 
tax points, giving Alberta a bigger share of the personal income tax (as in Quebec). Thus, 
for example, Alberta could choose a personal tax system that might be more conducive to 
attract the skilled labour it needs. Currently, federal transfers to Alberta are $8.3 billion or 
27 per cent of federal personal tax revenues paid by Albertans. Substituting cash transfers for 
personal tax points would increase Alberta’s personal income tax collections by two-thirds to 
$20.4 billion, giving the province much more control over redistribution. 
• The provinces have ownership of resources while the federal government has joint control 
over environmental regulation. A federal-provincial agreement that reduces friction over 
environmental policy would help reduce conflicts over resource ownership and sustainability. 
• Carbon policies could be co-ordinated by the federal government, but leave the provinces to 
determine the “means” to achieve federal targets. For example, the federal government would 
develop an agreement with the provinces to establish targets and provinces would present for 
federal approval the policies they will use to reach the target. No longer would the federal 
government dictate the mechanism, as is currently the case with carbon-tax or cap-and-trade 
policies. 
• The equalization program that was recently renewed without discussion among the provinces 
should be reviewed for improvement. Even if the program remains based on equalizing fiscal 
capacities among provinces, it is not clear how fiscal capacity should be measured and how to 
make the program more responsive to risks faced by the provinces. The current stabilization 
program that provides funds to provinces seeing a significant drop in revenues is capped at 
$60 per capita and fails to include volatile resource revenues. 
17 
Fellows (2018) estimates that, annually, the federal government is losing $1.5 billion, industry $6.7 billion and the Alberta 
government $7.6 billion due to discounted oil prices from pipeline constraints. 
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CONCLUSIONS
This analysis focuses on two different forms of regional conflict in a federation: conflict of taste 
and conflict of claim. Conflict of taste arises from differences in political preferences among 
populations and conflict of claim arises from one region having greater wealth than others and 
being expected to share it with others. This can be especially problematical when a small, rich 
region is expected to support large populations. Both conflicts lead to regional stress and unstable 
federations. Canada illustrates the nature of these conflicts: Quebec in terms of tastes and Alberta 
in terms of claim. While Canada has managed conflict of taste with various mechanisms, conflict 
of claim, which requires “sharing the wealth,” is far more difficult to resolve. 
To achieve unity, federations decide on the allocation of spending, taxing and regulatory powers 
to satisfy national and sub-national interests, often but not necessarily according to a written 
constitution. Even once powers are allocated to each level of sovereign government, mechanisms are 
needed to co-ordinate policies among the central and sub-national governments, such as regional 
representation in the central governing bodies including the cabinet, bilateral or multilateral 
agreements and meetings. An important mechanism is representation in national legislatures that 
provides an expression of regional interests in central-government decision-making. 
Canada lacks an elected national body that represents regional interests. Thus, much of the 
accommodation occurs with federal-provincial co-ordination mechanisms. However, if national 
parties focus only on political support from the large regions to the detriment of smaller ones, conflict 
potentially arises. Conflict of taste is more easily accommodated by assignment of certain powers to 
the provinces but conflict of claim, which often reflects a zero-sum game, is more challenging.
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https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/PACE-Program-Khanal.pdf
Mukesh Khanal | April 2019
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: THE DEPTH AND PREVALENCE OF POVERTY
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Social-Policy-Trends-Poverty-Depth-and-Prevalence-March-2019-USE.pdf
Ronald Kneebone | March 2019
UPDATING AN ODA POLICY IN CANADA: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL REMITTANCES IN DEVELOPMENT
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ODA-Policy-Bansak-Simpson.pdf
Nicole Simpson and Cynthia Bansak | March 2019
PROVINCIAL PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AND FINANCING IN ALBERTA: SEARCHING FOR A BETTER COURSE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Searching-for-a-Better-Course-McMillan.pdf
Melville McMillan | March 2019
TRADE POLICY TRENDS: CHINESE PROTECTIONISM: RESTRICTION ON CANOLA IMPORTS FROM CANADA
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Trade-Policy-Trends-Canola-Imports-Beaulieu-Klemen.pdf
Eugene Beaulieu and Dylan Klemen | March 2019
UNBLOCKING THE BOTTLENECKS AND MAKING THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN TRANSPARENT: HOW BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY CAN UPDATE GLOBAL TRADE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Global-Supply-Chain-Norberg-final.pdf
Hanna C. Norberg | March 2019
WHICH POLICY ISSUES MATTER IN CANADIAN MUNICIPALITIES? A SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL POLITICIANS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Canadian-Municipalities-Lucas-Smith.pdf
Jack Lucas and Alison Smith | March 2019
CANADA, U.K. STAND SHOULDER TO SHOULDER AMID GLOBAL TURMOIL
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Shoulder-to-Shoulder-Biggs.pdf
Zak Biggs | March 2019
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TRENDS: CARBON TAX COSTS VARY WIDELY ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Carbon-Tax-Costs-SPP-EE-Trends-MARCH-2019-final.pdf
Trevor Tombe and Jennifer Winter | March 2019
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: RENTS, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE SMALL TOWN ADVANTAGE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Social-Policy-Trends-CMA-Rents-to-SA-February-2019.pdf
Margarita Wilkins | February 2019
THE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS COVERAGE OF CARBON PRICING INSTRUMENTS FOR CANADIAN PROVINCES
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Carbon-Pricing-Dobson-Winter-Boyd-final.pdf
Sarah Dobson, Jennifer Winter and Brendan Boyd | February 2019
SHOULD ALBERTA ADOPT A LAND TRANSFER TAX?
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Land-Transfer-Tax-Dahlby-Larson.pdf
Bev Dahlby and Braeden Larson | February 2019
